Showing posts with label lectures. Show all posts
Showing posts with label lectures. Show all posts

Friday, October 2, 2009

Lecture Summary - Irving and Thomas Kahn

The following article is based on the inaugural video lecture given to the new value investing class at the Richard Ivey School of Business in 2005. Mr. Irving Kahn delivered the lecture alongside his brother Thomas. Irving served as the second teaching assistant to Benjamin Graham at the Columbia University Business School and he has over 78 years of experience in the investment business. Irving and his brother founded their investment firm, Kahn Brothers & Company, in 1978.
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The Kahn brothers are firm believers that value investing is an art, not a science. In making this point they allude to an artist that paints masterpieces as this artist will surely have some poor paintings along the way. If value investing were a science then it would be replicable. One would be able to run equations in a machine all day and consistently right answers would emerge, but since it doesn’t work this way it has to be an art.

As value investing is more art than science, a value investor has the greatest chance of success studying industries that they understand. The Kahn brothers recommend paying attention to smaller cap and obscure companies, as these will offer the investor who takes the time to learn more about the company, than does the public, a chance for great profit. This means looking at places where the markets are not overpriced and where there are companies that will enable a value investor to truly benefit. Sometimes to find these opportunities one must be patient and not necessarily have their portfolio invested all the time. Ultimately, the value investor has to stay strongly contrarian, as sometimes not committing capital to the markets is the best thing to do. You don’t need all your money on the table all the time and if markets are high don’t invest. Be very selective and keep your standards. At the time of the lecture (2005), the Kahn brothers were not finding a general theme in which they invest that they can say to go and look into. They are very adamant that while occasional themes evolve, all they can say is that they maintain that very strict contrarian approach. If something is very popular and everyone is buying the same stock they are, they stand back and ask themselves what they’re doing wrong. Half the price of a common stock is probably current fashion so if you can buy what’s currently out of favor, you are well on your way to investing successfully.

The Kahn brothers have a few important factors that they keep in mind when evaluating a potentially undervalued company:
  • The company should either be obscure or out of favor. It can be a big company that is not obscure though if it is very much out of favor.
  • Their analysis is very much balance sheet oriented. They are not interested in companies with excessively levered balance sheets and they like companies with little to no debt.
  • Management should be on the same page that the brothers are on. If management can own a lot of stock and are incentivized as shareholders that is a big positive.
  • They avoid companies that have, in combination; volatile cash flows, are excessively levered and have management that are not too swift. This would be a very bad combination.
  • The brothers are not so focused on the income statement initially. What they would ask is, what’s the earnings potential of the business? If it were run properly, if management succeeded in their plan to close a losing division, etc then what would be a reasonable earnings level? They check to see if the stock is cheap based on this earnings level and if they are confident that management can achieve this goal.
  • The brothers really don’t care if a company is losing money and they actually would like a company to be losing money (although not hemorrhaging cash) because that knocks the stock down and presents some wonderful investment opportunities.
The newspaper seems to be a major source of investment ideas for the Kahn brothers. Thomas points out that the new highs and lows lists, and their relative size to one another, give a good indication of the direction of the general market. While shopping the new lows list doesn’t seem like a hi-tech, sophisticated way to invest it can actually bring forth some interesting ideas. Events that will also be presented in the paper are if certain companies are having problems and their stock tanks as a result, or if entire industries are affected by a current event. When you find a problem in a company or industry, pull out the financials, do some work and see if any of the stocks have gotten knocked down to where they are attractive. You must then decide if they are attractive investments. The value investing philosophy has nothing to do with what’s on TV (i.e. the talking heads) as the journalists are interested primarily in which stocks are moving.

Value investing will not go away. One may think that with so much information out there, and available to the public, that for instance standard value screens such as price/earnings and price/book may not be as effective. In reality however it’s not about opening up Yahoo Finance and looking at the latest data. The Kahn brothers have positions in some very complicated to understand companies. They also have a position in a company that hasn’t filed in a year. Institutions can’t hold this company and one can’t pull the latest data up online. As a result, if you’re confident that management is sound then this presents an interesting buying opportunity. You ultimately have to look behind the situation and you have to do your homework to get a leg up on other investors.

Once value is found, the brothers tend to ease into a position rather than to buy in all at once. They like to buy a small stake and get to know the company better. Frequently shares they buy will go down, so they will do their homework and see if they were right in their analysis but just maybe bought too early. If so then they stick to their convictions and they buy some more. Some of the brothers’ best capital gains have come from this process of averaging down. They warn to not be fooled by “snake oil salesmen” who advertise making money extremely quick. Most of the Kahn brothers’ investments have a holding period of 3 to 7 years, and sometimes longer. There comes a point, where as with a plant, the company begins to wither. Management may no longer be good, competition may be getting worse; you can see this in advance and make a profit. Personally I would sell an investment as it approached my estimate of intrinsic value, as there are likely other underpriced opportunities where I can put this capital to work for above average returns. This is even for companies that remain strong.

When it comes to placing a value on the notion of growth, the Kahn brothers don’t see a point. They want to grow their capital and don’t care whether it’s by way of a growth company or not a growth company or whether earnings are growing quickly or not, they just want their capital to grow. If a company has clearly defined, great prospects then it’s common knowledge already. How can one determine how many of these great prospects are already priced into the stock? The brothers don’t feel particularly comfortable paying up for those great prospects as they don’t have a way of figuring out what they’re worth. As a result of avoiding stocks like these, the firm has very successfully grown their capital over the years and can postulate that they’ve taken less risk than the overall market. Everyone is enamored with growth stocks, but how about just growing your capital with non-growth stocks? That’s alright too.

Wednesday, September 16, 2009

Lecture Summary - Francis Chou

Francis Chou is the President of Chou Associates Management Inc., based out of Toronto. His funds, which were started as part of an investment club in 1981, won him the Canadian Investment Award title “Fund Manager of the Decade” in 2005.

The following is a summary of Francis Chou’s lecture, given to the Richard Ivey School of Business on August 19th, 2008.
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Mr. Chou began his lecture with some pointed questions to the audience. When you go shopping do you look for bargains? And when you find bargains does it make a good purchase and good financial sense? Presumably the majority of the audience raised their hands as Mr. Chou declared them to have the makeup of good investors (I did not attend this lecture in person and the audience was not visible on the video recording). He stated further that if you can take those principles from your everyday shopping experiences and transfer them to the stock market then you are well on your way to being a good investor. You do need to learn accounting however as it is the language of business.

Mr. Chou’s views on the pharmaceutical industry are that it contains good, strong companies with high returns on capital although a negative aspect is that it’s really hard to forecast the pipeline; you never know what new drugs competitors will be coming to market with in the coming years and which will be the blockbusters. To mitigate this risk he bought a basket of companies in the sector. Regarding allocation he says that if you are finding bargains in troubled industries you diversify, but if you are finding bargains in good companies then you concentrate.

The reason he saw the pharmaceutical sector as a good bet was because they were beaten down due to expiring patents. He saw this as a good opportunity to step in and buy a basket as there are sure to be new drugs coming through the pipeline in some of these firms, especially with the amount of R&D spend these companies expense. He foresees holding this basket for upwards of 5 years until there are significant events in the industry to drive the sector higher. He also mentioned that in a scenario like this, when you feel the whole sector has been hit and you want to diversify, an ETF is a good option.

As a side-note, when valuing companies Mr. Chou will never rely just on price-to-earnings as earnings can easily be manipulated. He likes to look at free cash flow multiples as well. And regarding evaluating the quality of management, he says to look at capital allocation over many years, not just one year. Additionally, numbers tell a story so you want to look at the numbers first and then evaluate management qualitatively as well.

The largest take-away for me from this presentation is the value of diversifying in certain industries, even as a value investor. I’ve always learnt that as a value investor you want to select the stock that is undervalued and have conviction in its true value, which mitigates the need for diversification and only risks minimizing your returns if you do. Mr. Chou points out a great example of an industry where you may know there’s value but you also have to realize the limitations inherent in making a selection as you never know which company’s laboratory the next blockbuster drug will come from.

Towards the end of his lecture Mr. Chou said something that I would like to reproduce here verbatim.

“If you believe in the value principles and you buy cheap just like you do in your day-to-day life and you think it makes good business sense, just do that in the stock market and you will be successful. The only difference in the stock market is that sometimes it plays on psychology; it plays on your own psychology, on your fears, your greed and sometimes when you buy a stock and it’s cheap it can get even cheaper. If you know what you’re doing and you know you’re buying it cheap and you have that courage to do what is right regardless of what the crowd is doing, there’s no reason why you should not be successful.”
He then went on to say, “And that’s what I did, I just stuck to my guns.” A great presentation by a great investor that should give us all the extra bit of conviction we need to stick to ours.

Wednesday, September 2, 2009

Lecture Summary - Seth Klarman

Seth Klarman is President of the Baupost Group, LLC. His firm, founded in 1982, manages $15 billion for institutional and high net worth clients. His now out of print book "Margin of Safety: Risk-Averse Value Investing Strategies for the Thoughtful Investor" sells for $1,200 on Amazon and $2,000 on eBay and has been stolen from most libraries.

The following is a summary of Seth Klarman's lecture, given to the Richard Ivey School of Business on March 17th, 2009.
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Klarman opened his speech by pointing out that peoples' investing temperament seems to be influenced by the state of the market when they graduated from school. As he said, "If you remember how cheap things can get, you don't easily forget that lesson." I attended this lecture in person while completing my MBA, and this statement had a direct impact on me as I would be graduating in one of the worst market climates in history.

In defining value investing, Klarman describes it as a risk averse approach. He says that it's a series of principles and a way of thinking about investing that forces you to first focus on risk, and only then on returns. As the downside is where the pain is for most people, value investing protects against that first.

Klarman's understanding based on research he has seen is that value investing via a mechanical approach (purely quantitative according to P/E, P/B, etc.) adds about 1% to 2% a year. He wonders, however, why anyone would trust a dumb formula when they can do even better through proprietary analysis and investigation. In doing so he can tell when some situations that look cheap (according to a mechanical method) aren't in fact that cheap. As such, his firm's approach to value investing is to follow the philosophy's principles while relying on their own fundamental and detailed research.

Klarman's approach to investing is based on three underlying pillars:
  • Focus on risk before focusing on return. This is not risk in the form of beta or volatility but risk in the sense of how much you can lose if you do in fact lose. He mentions that beta or volatility risk is not really risk unless you must sell on the day the price happens to be low. This approach he describes is very different from wall street where reports tend to be written using single point estimates focusing on the upside, with rarely a mention of the various possibilities of potential downside risk.
  • Adopt a view toward absolute returns. The world seems to focus on relative performance instead of absolute performance. This sticks most investment firms to the group of "ensured mediocrity" as many just try to lose less than their peers. In focusing on absolute performance, the thought to Klarman of losing any of his clients' capital is unacceptable.
  • Employ a bottom-up investment approach. Most of the world employs a top-down investment approach by analyzing the economy, interest rates, etc and then applying these findings to decisions to invest in certain sectors that should perform well in the relevant environment. Klarman does not know anyone with a long-term success rate in doing this. Macro forecasting is very difficult to do, and another issue is that even if you are right you must also be early or prices would have already moved to reflect your viewpoint. While Klarman will still think about the macro environment, he analyzes all his investments using a bottom-up approach.
Klarman started his firm in a similar fashion to Benjamin Graham's beginnings. He had a small amount of capital and would rummage around for mis-priced situations where there was a reason for mispricing and a catalyst present that would enable him to make money. Over the years his firm developed the following core principles:
  • Picking clients to ensure the firm will be able to maintain a flexible investment approach. This flexibility also allows the firm to capitalize on opportunities in different markets and asset classes.
  • Large amount of employee capital invested in the firm. He wants his firm to be the best place for employees to invest their capital. This ensures a vested interest in the work the employees are performing and would also be a great selling point.
  • Having an edge, a reason to think they can outperform. The biggest edge any investor can have, and his own firm's biggest advantage, is in having a long term investment horizon. Lots of funds feel pressure to hold cash or to buy short-term situations but are unable to seek out 3-5 year holds as the capital may only be available for 6 months.
  • Foster strong relationships. The firm works hard to ensure they have the best brokers and that they are these brokers' best clients. If they are somebody's first or second largest client then they know they will be made aware of opportunities when large blocks of shares come on the market, etc.
  • Having a niche. The firm's particular focus is in complicated situations, one of their favourite areas being in distressed debt. As many firms have mandates to sell when debt hits this distressed level, Klarman's firm is able to take advantage of the ensuing mispricing and is able to make a profit. This is a much more ideal situation then buying from a seller who knows more than you and who has done the analysis and has decided to sell as a result. Klarman's firm really likes situations where there is a supply/demand imbalance. Other examples are situations where a stock is getting kicked out of an index or where a stock is being spun-off from its parent company. In both these situations there are many institutions and indices that would need to sell indiscriminately. As Klarman says, "Time is scarce so you want to look at these situations where there is a good chance of mispricings."
More information about Seth Klarman as well as insights into the Baupost Group's holdings can be found at GuruFocus.com.

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